This paper examines the effect of agricultural development on a country's overall development and growth experience. In most poor countries, large fractions of land, labor, and other productive resources are devoted to producing food for subsistence needs. This "food problem" can delay a country's industrial development for a long period of time, causing its per capita income to fall far behind the world leader. Once industrialization begins, this trend is reversed. The extent to which a country catches up to the leader depends primarily on factors that affect productivity in non-agricultural activities: agricultural productivity is thus largely irrelevant in the very long run.
Introduction
Many poor economies suffer from what T.W. Schultz (1953) characterized as the "food problem." Simply put, Schultz argued that many poor countries are in a situation of "high food drain," in which they have "a level of income so low that a critically large proportion of the income is required for food." Schultz took it as given that countries in this situation must produce the bulk of their own food to satisfy subsistence needs, presumably because imports are prohibitively costly and because these countries have few goods or resources to exchange for food. Until they can meet their subsistence needs, Schultz said, they are unable to begin the process of modern economic growth.
Schultz's view was later echoed in a large literature on development, which held that an agricultural surplus is a necessary condition for a country to begin the development process. The hypothesis was a central argument of Johnston and Mellor (1961) , Johnston and Kilby (1975) and Timmer (1988) , among others. More recently, it has figured prominently in the writing of non-economists such as Diamond (1997) .
This paper explores the quantitative plausibility of Schultz's hypothesis. In particular, it puts forth a model of economic development and growth that implements Schultz's idea, and then uses the model to organize and interpret the evolution of international incomes over the last three centuries. We show that the model offers useful insights into the evolution of international income levels. In particular, we show that the model offers a plausible explanation for why some countries started to realize increases in per capita output much later in history than others; why once under way, structural transformation and the process of economic development proceed at different rates in different countries, the consequences of which are that some countries have continued to lose ground relative to the leader in terms of per capita output, some have gained ground, while others have neither gained or lost ground; and why some countries underwent growth miracles in the second half of the twentieth century.
The model we put forth is an extension of the neoclassical growth model that includes an agricultural sector. In both sectors, technology grows exogenously. We implement Schultz's idea by imposing a subsistence food requirement for consumers in the model economy. The subsistence constraint implies that resources cannot move out of agriculture if productivity there is too low to meet the food requirements of the population.
The model allows for a potentially long period of constant living standards in which subsistence agriculture is the sole economic activity. As time passes and the levels of the two technologies grow, the economy experiences a prolonged period in which it undergoes a structural transformation from a subsistence economy to a modern industrialized economy. The structural transformation begins in an economy once productivity in the agricultural sector reaches the level needed to meet the food requirements of the population. At this date the economy begins to realize increases in per capita output.
Once the structural transformation begins, the economy steadily shifts labor from agriculture into industry. The rate at which this sectoral transformation takes place -and at which per capita income grows -depends importantly on the exogenous rate of technological change in the agricultural sector as well as on productivity in the nonagricultural sector. Productivity in the non-agricultural sector matters because the nonagricultural good can be used as an input into agricultural production (e.g., mechanization). Asymptotically, agriculture's share of economic activity declines to zero and the model behaves like the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model.
The model predicts that all countries eventually make the transformation to a modern industrialized economy. Countries differ in the starting date of this transformation because of differences in climate, land quality, population density, policy, and institutions -all of which affect productivity in the agricultural sector. Countries differ in the speed at which the transformation proceeds because of differences in policies and institutions that affect productivity in the non-agriculture sector. Differences in nonagricultural productivity also determine long-run (asymptotic) differences in per capita incomes.
According to the model, the gap in per capita income between a late starter and an early starter may either increase or decrease while the late starter undergoes its structural transformation. This depends on the level of non-agricultural productivity in the late starter relative to the early starter. A late-starting country with a sufficiently high level of non-agricultural productivity (relative to an early starter) can experience a growth miracle and eliminate much of the income gap with the early starter.
A late starter can also realize a growth miracle by increasing its level of agricultural productivity, whether by improving policies or gaining an unexpected increase in its level of agricultural technology. (For example, a technology-driven Green Revolution can lead to a growth miracle.) However, a growth miracle induced by an increase in agricultural productivity differs in important ways from a growth miracle induced by an increase in industrial productivity. In particular, productivity improvements in agriculture can deliver a rapid "growth miracle" that shifts many workers out of agriculture, but these benefits do not translate into long-run increases in income. By contrast, high productivity in the non-agricultural sector will have small immediate effects in economies that are largely agricultural, but this will have large longrun consequences for a country's income level.
Our paper clearly owes a major intellectual debt to the early (but often less formalized) literature on agricultural development.
1 It is also related to a set of recent papers that seek to account for the process of economic development and growth in the very long run. Most of these papers seek to encompass, in a single model, the fact that living standards in most economies were low and relatively constant for long periods of time, followed by a transition period with modest and irregular growth, followed in turn by a period of modern economic growth. This set of papers includes: Galor and Weil (2000), Goodfriend and McDermott (1995) , Hansen and Prescott (2002) , King and Rebelo (1993), Laitner (2000) , and Lucas (2001) . These papers differ fundamentally from our paper in that they do not formally model an agriculture sector that coexists with the industrial sector. Our paper also relates to a set of recent papers that incorporate agriculture into growth models. This set of papers include: Caselli and Coleman (2001) , Echevarria (1995 Echevarria ( , 1997 , Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001) , Irz and Roe (2001) , Glomm (1992) , King and Rebelo (1993), and Matsuyama (1992) . With the exception of Caselli and Coleman, none of these papers offer insight into the role of agriculture in the evolution of international income differences. 2 Caselli and Coleman (2001) do this to some extent, although they examine the evolution of relative incomes across regions in the United States. They do not focus on the food problem, but instead focus on skills acquisition as a necessary condition for industrialization.
Our paper is most closely related to Rogerson (2002), and Kogel and Prskawetz (2001) . These papers similarly impose a subsistence constraint within a modern growth model and allow for exogenous technological change in the agricultural sector. Gollin et al. (2002) also use the model to interpret the evolution of international income differences. The main difference between our paper and these is that the earlier papers do not allow a feedback from industry to agriculture corresponding to the mechanization of farming.
Finally, this paper takes note of recent observations that economic growth does not come entirely from the manufacturing sector. Martin and Mitra (1999) find that TFP growth in agriculture exceeds that in manufacturing, in a cross-section of countries at varying levels of income. Similarly, Bernard and Jones (1996) find that agricultural TFP growth is higher than non-agricultural TFP growth in a sample of 14 OECD countries for a period from 1970-87. Our model differs from most recent growth papers in that it allows for this channel of economic growth.
1 In addition to Schultz (1953) and Schultz (1968) , important contributions include Johnston and Mellor (1961) , Fei and Ranis (1964) , Schultz (1964) , Lewis (1965) , Kuznets (1966) , Chenery and Syrquin (1975) , Johnston and Kilby (1975) , Hayami and Ruttan (1985) , Mellor (1986) , Timmer (1988), and Syrquin (1988) . 2 We note with irony that Schultz, in 1964, could write: "Growth economists have been producing an abundant crop of macro-models that are, with few exceptions, neither relevant in theorizing about the growth potential of agriculture nor useful in examining the empirical behavior of agriculture as a source of growth." A similar comment could easily have been made 30 or 40 years later.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 5 provides some empirical support for the food problem hypothesis. Section 3 describes the model economy and characterizes the equilibrium properties. Section 4 calibrates the model to the structural transformation of the United Kingdom over the period from 1750 to 2000. Section 5 then uses the calibrated model of economic development and growth to organize and interpret the evolution of international incomes levels over the last 250 years. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Empirical Support
The central tenet of our theory is that improvements in agricultural productivity allow resources to be released to other activities. Before proceeding, it is instructive to ask what the empirical support is for this proposition. In this section we document two facts about the agricultural transformation. First, in most poor countries, large amounts of labor and land are devoted to the production of basic foods for domestic consumption -in other words, to meeting subsistence needs. Second, increases in the productivity of the agricultural sector are associated with a structural transformation: the shifting of resources away from agriculture and into non-agriculture. We consider these two facts in turn.
Subsistence needs
In most poor countries, agriculture accounts for very large fractions of employment and value added. For all developing countries in 2000, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that agriculture accounted for 55 percent of employment, and for 65 countries designated as "low-income," agriculture employed 58 percent of the total workforce (FAOSTAT data, 2004 The implication is that countries experiencing increases in agricultural productivity are able to release labor and other resources from agriculture into other sectors of the economy. This finding is particularly important because the data suggest that in most poor countries, output per worker in non-agriculture is far higher than in agriculture. This 5 Agriculture's share of employment is a useful measure of agriculture's importance in economic activity. The other commonly reported measure -agriculture's share of GDP -is directly related to increases in productivity and thus is a less attractive measure of agriculture's importance in the economy.
means that a shift of workers from agriculture to non-agriculture increases average productivity in the economy. For example, shifting a worker from agriculture to nonagriculture in 1960 would have tripled his or her output in Korea or Malaysia; it would have increased it by a factor of nine in Thailand.
A Model of Structural Transformation

The Economy
Our model is an adaptation of those of Laitner (2000) and Hansen and Prescott (2002) .
The basic structure of our model is that of the one-sector neoclassical growth model, extended to allow for an explicit agricultural sector in addition to the usual nonagricultural sector. The extension is done in such a way that the process of development is associated with a structural transformation of economic activity, characterized by a declining share of economic activity accounted for by the agriculture. Asymptotically, agriculture's share of the labor force shrinks to zero, and the model becomes identical to the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model.
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Economies are treated as being closed. Hence, each economy is required to produce its own food. This assumption precludes a poor country that is relatively unproductive at producing food from simply importing it, a restriction that can be significant for some specifications of our model. However, this assumption is consistent with the data: the evidence is that imports of basic foodstuffs tend to be quite small in developing countries.
For example, FAO data show that, taking all low-income countries together, net imports of food supplied around 5 percent of total calorie consumption in 2000 (FAOSTAT data, 2004 
Preferences
The model economy is populated by an infinitely-lived representative family.
Instantaneous utility is defined over two consumption goods: a non-agricultural good denoted by c t , and an agricultural good denoted by a t . To account for the secular decline in agriculture's share of economic activity we follow the convention of assuming a utility function with non-homothetic preferences, similar to the familiar Stone-Geary specification. To keep the analysis simple, we adopt a rather extreme functional form, namely 9 , 7 In reality it may be that although agriculture's share of economic activity becomes small, it remains bounded away from zero. This would not matter at all for our analysis. 8 We do not attempt to model why a country that might benefit from food imports chooses not to do so. One set of explanations might involve trade barriers or policy distortions. An alternative and compelling story is simply that transport costs and infrastructure stocks make it infeasible to deliver imported food to population centers at prices that compete with domestic production -at least for countries with sizable populations living in interior regions. Countries with large fractions of their population inhabiting coasts with good ocean access (e.g., Hong Kong, Singapore) may not face the "food problem." 9 Technically we should assume that a family has a very small endowment of the nonagricultural good that is always consumed to avoid the issue that instantaneous utility is lowered when c increases from zero to a small positive amount. We ignore this for simplicity.
Lifetime utility is given by:
where β is the subjective time discount factor.
These preferences imply that a family will never consume the agricultural good beyond a no matter how cheap agricultural goods may be relative to nonagricultural goods. In equilibrium this will imply that once output in the agricultural sector reaches a , all remaining labor will flow out of agriculture regardless of the state of the nonagricultural sector. More generally, one might expect that a very low level of relative productivity in the non-agriculture sector might cause more labor to be allocated to agricultural production as consumers shift their consumption bundles toward agricultural goods. This is potentially an important effect and one that we focused on in Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2004) . We abstract from it here, not because we believe it is insignificant, but rather because we want to focus attention on the reallocation of labor and capital, rather than consumption.
Endowments
The representative family is endowed with one unit of time each period. Additionally, the family is endowed with the economy's stock of land, denoted by L, which is normalized to 1. Land does not depreciate in the model. The family is not endowed with any initial holdings of capital. It will, however, come to own capital at some date.
Technologies
Non-Agriculture
Following the tradition in the literature, we associate o the nonagricultural sector with the "manufacturing" or "industrial" sector, though in fact it is meant to capture the full range of activities in manufacturing, mining, services, and other nonagricultural sectors. We use the subscript m to refer to non-agricultural variables. The nonagricultural sector produces output (Y t ) using capital (K mt ) and labor (N mt ) as inputs according to the following constant returns to scale technology:
In equation (3), E m is an efficiency parameter that determines total factor productivity in the non-agriculture technology, and γ m is the constant exogenous rate of technological change.
10 This technology is standard except for the term εN mt . This term is added to the production function so that an economy with no physical capital can start manufacturing and accumulate capital. In the numerical work that follows we will pick ε to be a small number.
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The efficiency parameter, E m , is assumed to be country-specific, being determined by policies and institutions that impact on activity in the non-agriculture sector. 12 It can be interpreted as the fraction of the exogenous stock of knowledge in the world that a country would use, given its institutions, were it to produce the non-agricultural good. In contrast, the parameters γ m and ε are identical across countries. To be sure, the growth rate of productive knowledge has not been constant through history. The assumption of a constant rate of technological change, however, is not critical to the results we establish in this paper. Additionally, much of the stock of useful knowledge owes its creation to research and development in the rich countries. Poor countries are generally not in the business of creating ideas, and so from their perspective, the assumption of exogenous technological change is reasonable.
Output from the manufacturing sector can be used for consumption or to augment the capital stock. The non-agriculture resource constraint is thus,
and the law of motion for the stock of capital in the economy is
Agriculture
We distinguish between three technologies to produce the agricultural good. The first of these, which is indexed by 0, corresponds to a traditional, or Malthusian, technology. For this technology, we think of the household itself as the production unit, consuming all that it produces. The key features of this technology are that it is not subject to exogenous technological change and it is not affected by policy. The inputs to the traditional technology are labor services (N 0t ) and land services (L 0t ). The amount of output produced from the traditional technology (A 0t ) is given by
We assume that when all of the economy's labor and land are employed in the traditional technology the economy produces a units of the agricultural good. Given our normalization of the family's endowments of time and land, this assumption
. There is nothing particularly special about this normalization. Our results
would not be much affected by alternatively introducing a TFP parameter to the traditional technology and using a different value for a .
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The other two agricultural technologies, indexed by the numbers 1 and 2, are both subject to exogenous technological change and are affected by policy. The key difference between them is that Technology 2 uses land, labor, and capital produced in the manufacturing sector whereas Technology 1 uses only land and labor.
We think of Technology 1 as essentially an intensification of traditional agriculture, in the sense described in the early development literature by Ester Boserup (1965) and Clifford Geertz (1966) . We associate Technology 1 with the family farm that produces more than its members working on the farm consume. Intensification occurs in this stage through shortening of fallows, improved manipulation of crop rotations, manures and organic fertilizers, and construction of terraces, bunds, drains, and other land modifications. Hayami and Ruttan (1985) note that this stage of technological advance was critical in the English agricultural revolution. They further note that "[t]he net effect was a substantial growth in both total agricultural output and output per acre." They further note that "[t]he inputs used in this conservation system of farming were largely supplied by the agricultural sector itself." 13 We note that there are reasons to believe that a value close to a is appropriate. Models in which fertility is endogenous suggest that output per capita will be close to subsistence levels for economies that have not begun the process of industrialization.
By contrast, Technology 2 involves the use in agriculture of manufactured capital goods. We think of this technology as reflecting the introduction of manufactured farm implements, transport equipment, processing machinery, etc. To some degree, we also think of the introduction of chemical fertilizers as a kind of capital, in the sense that they allowed farmers to build up soil fertility (or to reduce nutrient loss) on continuously farmed land.
Agricultural output from Technology 1 (A 1t ) is given by
whereas agricultural output produced using Technology 2 (A 2t ) is given by
In equations (7) and (8), E a is an efficiency parameter, which is country-specific. As was the case with the manufacturing technology, one source of cross-country differences in this parameter is policies and or institutional features that impact on agricultural activity.
However, another very important source of variation is differences in the amount or quality of land per person, and climate. In particular, technological innovations that are useful for a specific crop in a given climate may not be particularly relevant for other crops in other parts of the world, thus generating large differences in cross-country productivity levels that are independent of policy.
The parameter γ a denotes the rate of exogenous technological change in the modern agricultural technologies. Though it is easy to imagine circumstances in which (because technological innovations are not applicable in all countries) growth rates of technology may differ across countries, for the purposes of our analysis here, we assume that this value is common to all countries.
There are several reasons why we use two "modern" agricultural technologies rather than one. The first reason is purely technical. We need to allow for some mechanism by which the structural transformation can begin. If the agricultural technology given by equation (7) did not exist, no economy would ever be able to move resources out of agriculture and grow. 14 Second, as evidenced both by England's historical experience and by the more recent experience of the Green Revolution in developing countries, major increases in output can be realized without significant manufactured inputs. For example, in the Green Revolution, large increases in rice harvests followed the introduction of new seed varieties -even in places where farmers continued to use animal power and hand tools.
In the model economy, output from the agriculture sector can only be used for consumption purposes. The agriculture resource constraint for the economy is simply
. The assumptions we make on the economy imply that the traditional technology will not be used in equilibrium if either of the modern technologies is used.
Solving for Equilibrium
We focus on the competitive equilibrium for this economy. Solving the competitive equilibrium is fairly straightforward. As long as E a (1 + γ a ) t < 1, an economy will specialize in agriculture using the traditional technology in order to meet its subsistence needs. The economy will switch into agricultural Technology 1 in the first period for 14 Alternatively, Technology 1 could be dropped from the model economy by assuming the traditional technology is subject to technological change after some date which E a (1 + γ a ) t ≥ 1, and will begin manufacturing in the first period in which
Denote the first period in which the economy can move resources into manufacturing by T. The competitive equilibrium allocations solve the following planner's problem starting with T:
[ ]
The maximization is over the sequence of choices .
Let the numeraire for the economy be the agricultural good. Prices can be determined as follows. First, the rental prices of land and labor are just the marginal physical products from the agricultural technology that is used. Second, the price of the manufactured good can be determined by using the marginal physical product of labor from agriculture with the marginal physical product of labor from manufacturing. The rental price of capital is just the marginal product of capital in agricultural Technology 2 as long as that technology is used. Otherwise, it is the price of the manufactured good times the marginal physical product of capital in manufacturing.
Computationally, we exploit the fact that in the limit the economy converges to the one-sector neoclassical growth model. We employ a shooting algorithm in which only a guess for the value for k T+1 is needed to compute the entire path of allocations for the economy from t = T to t = T+350. As part of this algorithm, we determine for any k t the optimal allocations of capital, labor and land service inputs for all technologies
Model Calibration
In this section we calibrate the model to the experience of the United Kingdom over the last 200 years and show that the model replicates the long run pattern of economic development and growth. Namely, we show that the model can account for the long initial period of constant living standards, followed by a transition period with small and irregular increases in per capita income, followed by period of modern economic growth with constant and large increases in per capita income.
Parameter Values
The empirical counterpart of the model period is a year. The strategy of the calibration exercise is to restrict the values of the preference parameters and the parameters associated with the manufacturing side of the economy to match twentieth century observations of the United Kingdom and other currently rich industrialized nations.
The values of the parameters associated with the agricultural side of the economy are restricted so that the model matches the structural transformation of the United Kingdom, and estimates of agricultural production functions by Hayami and Ruttan (1985) . Table 2 reports the values of the parameters. A detailed explanation of how the value of each parameter was selected is as follows.
Preference Parameters
There are two preference parameters: the subjective time discount factor, β and the subsistence agriculture parameter, a . The subsistence agriculture parameter is normalized to 1, because its value determines the units in which the agricultural good is measured. The value of the subjective discount factor, β, is set so that the real interest rate (measured in the non-agricultural good) implied by the model asymptotically equals the real interest rate in the rich industrialized countries over the twentieth century of 5 percent.
Agricultural Sector Parameters
There are five parameters associated with the agricultural sector: the labor share parameter associated with both the traditional agricultural technology, and modern Technology 1, α; the exogenous rate of technological change, γ a ; the efficiency parameter associated with the modern agricultural technologies, E a ; and the capital share and labor share parameters associated with the modern agricultural Technology 2, φ and µ. We take the value of the labor share parameter, α, from historical estimates of labor and land shares by Clark (1998) . The share parameters, φ and µ, associated with modern Technology 2 are based on estimates of aggregate agricultural production functions by Hayami and Ruttan (1985) . The parameters E a and γ a are set so that the model matches UK agriculture employment shares in 1800 and 1950, which are reported by Kuznets (1966) to be 35 percent and 5 percent respectively.
Non-Agricultural Parameters
There are five parameters associated with the non-agricultural production: the exogenous rate of technological change, γ m; the depreciation rate, δ; efficiency, E m ; the labor productivity parameter, ε; and the capital share parameter, θ. The value for γ m is set so that asymptotically the growth rate of per capita output implied by the model matches the growth rate of per capita output in the United Kingdom over the latter part of the twentieth century reported by Maddison (1995) . The depreciation rate is set to the standard value of 0.065. The labor productivity parameter, ε, is set to 0.0001. The motivation for this choice is that the parameter must be non-zero so that the economy can accumulate capital starting with no capital, but it should be close to zero so that it does not affect the model's predictions once the economy has a positive capital stock.
The value of E m affects the rate at which the structural transformation occurs, and the date at which the economy first begins using the mechanized agricultural production technology. Consequently, the value of the efficiency parameter can be restricted by requiring the date at which the switch to Technology 2 is made in the model matches the date at which farming was mechanized in the United Kingdom. The economic history literature offers conflicting views on when this switch actually occurred. It is clear that some manufactured capital goods have been used in agriculture for a very long time, but the major transformation of the technology -to one making routine and extensive use of manufactured capital goods -appears to have happened after the late 1700s and to have been complete by the middle of the 19 th century. Robert C. Allen (1999) has argued convincingly that 1800 marks an important break-point in the English historical data, with a "post-1800 surge in productivity" in agriculture contributing significantly to overall economic growth after 1815. A key part of this productivity surge appears to be the contribution of early mechanization, such as the rapid improvement in plough designs documented by Brunt (2003) , who notes that by 1850, "agricultural implements were an important part of England's inventory of advanced machinery, which was the envy of the world." In our calibration exercise, then, we take 1800 as the date of England's transition to Technology 2.
The value of the capital share is not well restricted by the national income and product accounts (NIPA). The main reason for this is that the NIPA measure investment in only one form of capital, namely physical capital. Intangible capital investments, for example, worker training, R&D expenditures, and software purchases are treated as ordinary business expenses, and thus go unmeasured in the NIPA. Our strategy in the calibration is to set θ = .50 for the benchmark case and then examine the sensitivity of the model to alternative values of the capital share parameter where ever appropriate.
The reason we use θ = .50 for the benchmark is that this value implies that asymptotically investment in intangible capital is the same size as investment in physical capital, and that the ratio of investment in physical capital to GDP implied by the model matches the ratio of 20 percent observed in the data. 15 By restricting the value of the total capital share in this way, it is possible to decompose θ into its intangible capital and tangible capital components, θ z and θ k , where θ k + θ z = θ. For the benchmark, the implied value of θ k is 0.24. Given this decomposition, it is possible to decompose total investment into its intangible and tangible capital components at any date along the equilibrium path. This is important because intangible capital investment must be subtracted from output in the model when comparisons between the model and the actual data are made.
Economic Development and Growth
In our calibration, the first year in which resources are moved out of agriculture in the United Kingdom is 1708. Prior to 1708, the model predicts a constant living standard at a subsistence level, which (like many other points) is a subject of some debate in the literature on English economic history, but which seems a reasonable abstraction. 16 After 1708, the model economy shows a steady but modest intensification of agriculture, with rising output per worker, and the beginning of non-agricultural production. By the process of the calibration, the first year in which agriculture starts using physical capital is 1800. Technology 1 continues to be operated for the next 5 years. Thereafter, all the economy's agricultural output is produced using Technology 2. Here, too, the model, despite its rather simple structure, does a fairly good job at matching the decline in agriculture's share of output. These findings are robust to alternative values for the non-agriculture capital share parameter, θ. 
The Evolution of International Income Levels
In this section we use the model to organize and interpret the evolution of international income levels over the last three centuries. In particular, we use the model to account for the following aspects of the evolution of international income levels:
• Economic growth started in different countries at different times with some countries starting to grow approximately 250 years after the United Kingdom started.
• Late starters' experiences have differed dramatically once economic growth began. Some countries -particularly those in Latin Americastarted economic growth around 1900, and subsequently maintained the same level of income relative to the leader. Other countries -particularly those in South East Asia -started to grow in the first half of the twentieth century and subsequently eliminated much of the gap with the leader. A third set of countries, particularly sub-Saharan countries, started growth only after 1950, and subsequently lost ground relative to the leader.
• Some of the late starters that eliminated much of their income gap with the leader have done so in an incredibly short time, doubling their per capita income in a decade. These growth miracle experiences are a very recent phenomenon and are limited to countries that were poor at the time their miracle started.
We now interpret each of these facts in turn.
Late Starts to Development
According to the model the date at which an economy begins to industrialize is determined solely by the agriculture efficiency parameter. None of the parameter values associated with the non-agriculture technology affects this date. Consequently, we interpret delays in the starting date of economic growth as the outcomes of low efficiency in the agricultural sector.
We now explore the relative disparities in agricultural productivity needed to account for given delays in the start of economic development. Table 3 reports the implied value of agricultural productivity needed to make a country begin its structural transformation in 1800, 1850, 1900, 1950 and 2000. Recall that the calibration implies a 1708 starting date for the leader. The only parameter that differs between these economies is the agricultural productivity level, given by E a . The non-efficiency component of agricultural TFP, namely, (1+γ a ) t is the same across countries at all dates. Table 3 also reports the late starter's relative income at the starting date. Relative income for each distorted economy is computed using year 2000 prices from the benchmark economy.
Are these factor differences in relative agricultural efficiency plausible? We are unaware of any study that computes Solow residuals associated with agricultural production in a cross section of countries. 18 Those studies that compute Solow residuals associated with an aggregate production function for a cross section of countries (see for example, Hall and Jones 2000), find that factor difference in relative efficiencies between rich and poor countries to be as much as five. In light of this finding, the factor differences in agricultural efficiency implied by the model to account for the extremely late starts some countries have had seem plausible. From a quantitative perspective, this seems to support the longstanding idea in the development literature that agricultural 18 Some crude comparisons, however, suggest that these numbers are not out of line with reality. Prasada Rao (1993) found that agricultural output per worker, measured in PPP terms, was more than 100 times higher in leading countries than in the poorest. Similarly, FAO data (FAOSTAT data, 2004) show that cereal yields in the highest-productivity countries were 20 times higher than in the lowest-productivity countries, for 2000.
productivity differences -whether induced by nature or by policy -are a major reason that some countries are so poor.
Note that the subsistence constraint is important for this result. In general, if one economic activity is hindered by low productivity or policy distortions, economic agents will devote fewer resources to that activity and more to alternative activities, thereby lessening the impact of the "problem." However, in our model, output from agriculture is necessary and hence the economy cannot substitute away from it. Moreover, if productivity in agriculture goes down, then there will actually be an increase in the number of resources devoted to that activity.
Development Subsequent to Late Start
Although a country's efficiency in non-agriculture is unimportant for determining the date at which its begins its structural transformation and starts to grow, it is critical for determining its subsequent path of development -and in particular for whether it continues to lose ground or gain ground relative to the leader. Accordingly, we interpret the very different development experiences of late starters (subsequent to starting the process of economic development) as resulting from different non-agricultural efficiencies.
We now consider the impact of non-agricultural efficiency on a country's subsequent Consequently, the model offers a plausible explanation for why a number of countries, particularly those in Latin America, maintained a constant relative income with the leader over the last century; why a number of countries, particularly those in Asia have gained ground relative to the leader over the last fifty years; and why some countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, continue to lose ground relative to the leader. According to the model, a country that begins the structural transformation in 1950 will lose ground relative to the leader for the next 100 years provided that its nonagricultural efficiency is less than 25 percent that of the leader. Differences of this magnitude in non-agricultural efficiency do not seem implausible, given estimates of TFP for a number of manufacturing and service industries by Bailey (1993) , Bailey and Gerbach (1995) , and Bailey and Solow (2001) for a set of rich and middle-income countries.
A final point to be taken from this experiment concerns the speed of convergence once industrialization begins. The model predicts that asymptotically a country will converge to a steady-state relative per capita income level associated with the one-sector neoclassical growth model. It is important to emphasize that this convergence is much slower than one would observe in the one-sector neoclassical growth model, if one started out with a small amount of initial capital. The reason is that in our model labor is moved only slowly into the non-agricultural sector, whereas in the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model the entire labor endowment is always in that sector. This matters a lot for the speed of convergence to the steady state.
These findings are not sensitive to the value of the non-agricultural capital share parameter. Changing its value only implies a different relative value of E m above which a late starter gains on the earlier starter, and below which the late starter loses ground on the earlier starter. For larger capital share values, this critical value of E m is smaller.
Growth Miracles
The model allows for two interpretations of a growth miracle, by which we mean a doubling of per capita income in a decade or less. One interpretation follows directly from the numerical experiment of the last subsection. In particular, the previous experiment implies that a country that has only recently begun its structural 
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We proceed to compare the growth miracles associated with each of these sources.
We then follow this with a discussion of why the model predicts that growth miracles are a recent phenomenon and limited to poor countries at the date the miracle began. 19 The Green Revolution is the term used to describe the application of modern (conventional) plant breeding techniques to the problems of developing countries. By construction, per capita output in the two miracle economies is the same in 1962, which is roughly two times the 1950 level. The paths are extremely different both before and after this date. Before 1962, the economy that undergoes the increase in agricultural efficiency is richer at first, but after 1962 is forever poorer. This is not surprising in light of the properties of the model: agricultural efficiency does not affect a country's asymptotic level of relative per capita income whereas non-agricultural efficiency does.
The miracle generated by an increase in agricultural efficiency is thus short-lived compared to the miracle generated by a high level of non-agricultural efficiency. The effects of the green revolution are not short-lived, however. This is seen by comparing the plots of the country that undergoes a green revolution and the one that does not. One hundred years later, the economy that undergoes a green revolution in 1951 is still richer than the economy that does not but has the same non-agricultural efficiency.
The late starter with the non-agricultural efficiency of the leader grows rapidly over the 1950 to 1985 period. Per capita GDP increases by a factor 13 over this period. The annual growth rate for the economy is not monotonic. Indeed, it is hump-shaped, a pattern that has been documented for the growth miracle experiences of some countries, such as Japan. The annual growth rate increases over the 1950-1960 period, and thereafter decreases until it converges to the steady state growth rate of the leader.
A factor increase of 13 in a 35-year period may seem too large relative to the actual growth miracle experiences of Japan and South Korea. However, neither country was as poor relative to the United Kingdom in 1950 as the model economies in these experiments are. Japan's per capita GDP in 1950 was about 30 percent of the UK level.
In the next 35 years, Japan's per capita GDP increased by factor 8. This is roughly the predicted increase for the non-agricultural miracle economy for the 35-year period that follows the date it attains a relative income equal to 30 percent the leader.
The model predicts a slower speed of convergence with a higher value for the capital share parameter in non-agriculture. For example when θ = .60, per capita GDP in the non-agricultural economy increases by a factor 7 in the first 35 years of its transformation. The implied asymptotic ratio of investment in intangible capital to GDP is 36 percent when the capital share is 60 percent, which is well within the range of ratios estimated by Parente and Prescott (2000) using micro data.
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Additionally, this experiment effectively assumed that the 1950 starter always had good policy related to its non-agriculture sector in place, even before it began its structural transformation, but this need not be the case. A late starter will undergo a growth miracle following policy reforms that result in a large increase in relative efficiency in non-agriculture. Policy reforms may be gradual, so that increases in relative non-agricultural efficiency may be spread out. This would obviously reduce the speed of convergence.
We conclude this section with the explanation afforded by the model for why growth miracles are a recent phenomenon and why they are limited to poor countries at the time the miracle begins. Growth miracles are a recent phenomenon because the stock of both agricultural and non-agricultural knowledge has increased over time. Thus, a late starter will use less of the available stock of knowledge and be further behind the income of the leader compared to an earlier starter. Should a late starter have a high non-agricultural efficiency once it starts the structural transformation possibly on account of policy reform, or should it increase its agricultural efficiency, it will realize large increases in per capita output in a precisely because it is so much further behind. Growth miracles are limited to poor countries because rich countries by definition have a high relative efficiency and so use almost all of the stock of available knowledge.
Conclusion
We have shown in a rather simple model that low agricultural productivity can delay industrialization process for a long period of time. By delaying the industrialization process, such policies result in a country's per capita income falling far behind the leader.
Improvements in agricultural productivity can hasten the start of industrialization, and by doing so can have large effects on a country's relative income. Such changes will, in the short-run have a larger impact than a comparable change in non-agriculture. Ultimately, however, the nature of non-agricultural policy determines a country's position to the leader. While we have painted a picture of development that uses fairly broad brush strokes, we believe the important message that emerges is that greater attention to the determinants of productivity in agriculture will greatly enhance our understanding of cross-country differences in income. 
